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• Current RIS active measures
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Soviet Intelligence Services
Two main elements of SIS:
• State security service
• Military intelligence







• 1954-91: Committee for State Security (Komitet 
Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti: KGB)
KGB Foreign Intelligence
• 1920: INO (International 
Department)
• 1953: First Main Directorate (FMD) 
of MGB/KGB
The “Neighbors”: The GRU
• Soviet/Russian military intelligence
• Main Intelligence Directorate of the 
General Staff
• De facto subordinated to 
KGB from 1930s-1991
KGB Foreign Intelligence Methods
• Espionage: collecting information from foreign 
adversaries  through human and technical means 
(spying)




• Use of propaganda and disinformation to 
advance USSR interests, undermine 
adversaries
• Provocations/false and misleading 
information/“Fake news” stories/forgeries/
• Influence target audience (public and decision 
makers)
Why Active Measures
• “Soviet leaders do not regard war and politics as 
distinct conditions….politics is a continual state of 
war carried on by a wide variety of means.”
• “Moscow views international politics as a constant 
struggle. Soviet leaders employ a broad range of 
military and non-military measures against all 
adversaries.”
Source: Shultz, Richard H., and Roy Godson. Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy. Washington: 
Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984. P. 2
Active Measures
• Source: http://documentstalk.com/wp/agayants-ivan/
• Tsarist lineage 
(“Protocols”)
• “Dezinformatsiya”; 
Intensified in late 1950s
• Centralized in 1959: 
Department D of FMD
• Became Service A in 
1962
• “Fraternal” services 
participated
Active Measures
• “The term “Active Measures’ came into use in the 
USSR in the 1950s to describe overt and covert 
techniques for influencing events and behaviour in 
foreign countries. Disinformation – the intentional 
dissemination of false information – is just one of 
many elements that made up active measures 
operations.”
Source: Cull, Nicholas J., Vasily Gatov, Peter Pomerantsev, Anne Applebaum and Alistair Shawcross. “Soviet 
Subversion, Disinformation and Propaganda: How the West Fought Against it. An Analytic History, with Lessons 
for the Present: Final Report.” LSE Consulting, October 2017. P. 6
Active Measures
• “Our friends in Moscow call it ‘dezinformatsiya.’ Our 
enemies in America call it ‘active measures,’ and I, 
dear friends, call it ‘my favorite pastime.’”
—Col. Rolf Wagenbreth, Director of Department X, East 
German foreign intelligence (STASI)
Source: Schoen, Fletcher and Christopher J. Lamb. Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: 
How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 
2012. P. 8
Active Measures
• USA regarded as “Main Adversary” from 1945-91.
• Top priority target of KGB
• NATO/UK/France/West Germany
• Influence public opinion/divide western alliance
Active Measures
• Foster and exploit divisions in US society
• Increase anti-Americanism abroad/divide US from 
allies
• More successful overseas than in USA
Active Measures
• Notable increase in late 1950s
• First major campaigns directed at West Germany
• Kampfverband-1957
• Swastika campaign-1959
• JFK assassination conspiracy theories
• 350-400 actions per year by 1965
Active Measures 
• Intensified in 1970s
• Philip Agee/CAIB
• Forged US letters/military manuals
• FM 30-31B
• Italian letter
• “Holocaust Again for Europe”
• 1979 represented active measures “peak” (T. Rid)
Active Measures The US Response
• Inconsistent for many years
• 1961-first congressional hearing; “Lawrence Britt” in 
1971
• Additional hearings in 1979-82
• 1981-Active Measures Working Group
• US Information Agency played lead role
Operation Denver
Cartoon published in Pravda, October 31, 1986, alleging that AIDS was 
the work of American biological warfare researchers. Reproduced in: 
Geissler, Erhard and Robert Hunt Sprinkle. “Disinformation Squared: 
Was the HIV-from-Fort-Detrick Myth a Stasi Success?” Politics and the 
Life Sciences: The Journal of the Association for Politics and the Life 
Sciences 32 2 (2013): 2-99. P.27. DOI:10.2990/32_2_2
• Most famous Soviet 
active measures 
campaign
• AIDS was created in lab 
at Ft. Detrick, MD
• Three decade history of 
BW accusations against 
the US
Operation Denver
• ‘We are conducting a series of [active] measures in 
connection with the appearance in recent years in the USA of 
a new and dangerous disease, “Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome – AIDS”…, and its subsequent, large-scale spread to 
other countries, including those in Western Europe. The goal 
of these measures is to create a favorable opinion for us 
abroad that this disease is the result of secret experiments 
with a new type of biological weapon by the secret services of 
the USA and the Pentagon that spun out of control.’
—Telegram from KGB to Bulgarian State Security, September 7, 
1985.
Source: Selvage, Douglas and Christopher Nehring. Operation “Denver”: KGB and Stasi Disinformation 
regarding AIDS. Sources and Methods Blog, Woodrow Wilson Center, July 22, 2019.
Operation Denver
• Begun in 1983; Revitalized in 1985
• Aided by Stasi and Bulgarian intelligence
• Global impact from Fall 1985-Fall 1987
• Substantial US pushback
• Abandoned in Fall 1987; replaced by “baby parts” 
campaign
Active Measures
• By 1985, Service A was spending $3-4 billion per year
• Much of the KGB felt they were winning the struggle 
against the “Main Enemy” up until the Soviet 
collapse
Russian Intelligence Today
•KGB broken up into several parts in 1991
•Most internal security functions became part of 
Federal Security Service (FSB)
•First Main Directorate became 
Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)
•GRU gained autonomy (Now “GU”)
Russian Intelligence Today
•Russian Intelligence Services (RIS) see 
themselves as successors to Soviet 
security services
•Fundamental continuity of methods and 
worldview (adapted for digital age)
Russian Intelligence Today
• America is still the “main target”
• Active Measures relabeled as “Support Measures”
• RIS see themselves at war with USA/liberal West (M. Galeotti)
• Belief that USSR was subverted by USA/West
• Fear that this will happen to Russia via “color 
revolutions”/democracy promotion
• RIS seek to weaken and discredit USA/NATO/EU
Russian Intelligence Today
• “Listen: we engage in foreign policy the way we 
engage in war, with every means, every weapon, every 
drop of blood. But like in war, we depend on both the 
strategy of the general in the High Command, and the 
bravery and initiative of the soldier in the trench.” 
Former Russian diplomat to Mark Galeotti, April 2017




• RIS compete against each other to carry out broader agenda 
(FSB v. SVR v. GRU)
• Use of Oligarchs/organized crime/financial corruption
• Exploitation of digital/cyber capabilities
• Soviet-era methods updated for 21st century
Active Measures in 
the Digital Age
• Hacks to unearth compromising 
material (WADA, USADA, OPCW)
• Disinformation via social media




What Happened in 2016
•Two main elements:
•Hacking/dumping of Democratic Party emails
•Social media active measures campaign
•Not the first Soviet/Russian active measures campaign 
tied to US election
•Unprecedented in scope and intensity
Email Hacking/Dumping
• 2015: Democratic National Committee (DNC) hacked by Cozy Bear 
(SVR)
• March/April 2016: DNC, DCCC and others affiliated with Clinton 
campaign hacked by Fancy Bear (GRU Unit 26165): over 300 
individuals targeted
• June 2016: hacked emails released by GRU Unit 74455 via “DC Leaks” 
and “Guccifer 2”
• July 2016: Unit 74455 shares hacked emails with Wikileaks
• July 22: First Wikileaks email release
Email Hacking/Dumping
• July 27: “Russia, if you’re listening…”
• Five hours later: Unit 26165 targets 15 email accounts at Hillary 
Clinton’s personal office
• October 7, 2016: John Podesta email release
• 33 email tranches released by Wikileaks between October 7-
November 7
• Hacks of all 50 state election organizations
• No evidence vote tallies altered
2016 Election Hacks
• “The General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 
probably began cyber operations aimed at the US election by 
March 2016. We assess that the GRU operations resulted in the 
compromise of the personal e-mail accounts of Democratic 
Party officials and political figures. By May, the GRU had 
exfiltrated large volumes of data from the DNC.  
• We assess with high confidence that the GRU relayed material 
it acquired from the DNC and senior Democratic officials to 
WikiLeaks.” 
Source: Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections. 
Office of the Director of National intelligence, January 6, 2017. 
(https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf)
2016 Social Media Active Measures
• Project Lakhta begun in 2014
• Designed to use fake social media accounts to influence public 
opinion in Russia and abroad
• Funded by “Putin’s Chef:” Yevgeny Prigozhin
• Internet Research Agency (i.e.: the “troll farm”)
2016 Social Media Active Measures
• April 2014 – “translator project”, focused on US
• YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter
• $35,000,000 from 1/2016-6/2018
• Creation of fake social media accounts to exacerbate existing 




• “Heart of Texas”
2016 Social Media Active Measures
• 31,000,000 Facebook shares; 39,000,000 likes
• 185,000,000 Instagram likes, 4,000,000 comments
• 6,000,000 tweets; 73,000,000 user engagements
• Accounts targeting right-wing audiences encouraged voting for 
Trump
• Accounts targeting left-wing audiences discouraged voting for 
Clinton
Image posted by an IRA troll account during the 2016 election campaign. Shared by Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), November 
1, 2017.
Source: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-social-media-influence-2016-us-elections
Did Russia Want Trump to Win?
• “Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election 
represent the most recent expression of Moscow’s longstanding 
desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order, but 
these activities demonstrated a significant escalation in 
directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to 
previous operations.
• We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an 
influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential 
election. Russia’s goals were to undermine public faith in the US 
democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her 
electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin 
and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for 
President-elect Trump. We have high confidence in these 
judgments.”
Source: Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections. Office of the Director 
of National intelligence, January 6, 2017. 
(https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf)
Did Russia Want Trump to Win?
• Questioned by (then) GOP majority on House Intel Committee
• Supported by Dems on committee, bipartisan conclusion of 
Senate Intel Committee
• Supported by Mueller investigation findings
Mueller Findings
• “The Special Counsel’s investigation established that 
Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election 
principally through two operations. First, a Russian 
entity carried out a social media campaign that 
favored presidential candidate Donald J. Trump and 
disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. 
•Second, a Russian intelligence service conducted 
computer-intrusion operations against entities, 
employees, and volunteers working on the Clinton 
Campaign and then released stolen documents. 
•The investigation also identified numerous links 
between the Russian government and the Trump 
Campaign. 
Source: Mueller, Robert S,, III. Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential 
Election: Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. ʹ600.8(c). March 2019. P. 1-2.
Mueller Findings
•The Russian government perceived it would benefit 
from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that 
outcome
•The (Trump) Campaign expected it would benefit 
electorally from information stolen and released 
through Russian efforts, 
•The investigation did not establish that members of 
the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with 
the Russian government in its election interference 
activities.”
• Source: Mueller, Robert S,, III. Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 
Presidential Election: Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. ʹ600.8(c). March 2019. P. 1-2.
Active Measures in 2020
• Russia (and others) continue to use social media to try to 





• “In this connection I would like to mention one thing. 
It would be a big mistake to make a conclusion that 
Communist agents have successfully penetrated all the 
non-Communist world and that they are responsible 
for all its trouble and problems….In the present 
competition between the Communist and the non-
Communist world, Soviet-bloc intelligence is only one 
of many foreign policy instruments, and certainly not 
the most important one. Communist disinformation, 
propaganda and influence operation can’t win that 
competition.”
Ladislav Bittman (“Lawrence Britt”),  May 5, 1971
Source: Testimony of Lawrence Britt: Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the 
Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 
Ninety-Second Congress, First Session, May 5, 1971 








• Committee publications (hearings, reports, prints)
• Historical (1934-77):
• House Un-American Activities Committee (Y4.Un 1/2)
• House Committee on Internal Security (Y4.UN 8/15)
• Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security (Y4.J89/2)
• Current (1970s-present):
• House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Y4. IN 8/18)
• Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Y4.IN 8/19) 
• Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Y4. SE 2)
Executive Branch Sources
• Intelligence Agencies:
• FBI (J 1.14)
• CIA (PREX 3)
• NSA (D 1.2)
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